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INTRODUCTION 
In July of 2015, the Permanent Court of Arbitration in The 
Hague held a hearing over the dispute between the Philippines and 
China over territory in the South China Sea. On the third day of the 
hearing, the Court’s website suddenly went offline, an event which 
turned out to be the result of a cyberattack that originated in China. 
The hackers had infected the site with malware, making it so that 
anyone who visited the site was subject to data theft.1 With 
cyberattacks becoming increasingly more prevalent in all sectors of 
society, even a highly publicized and contentious international 
arbitration unfolding in the public eye was not immune. 
Cybersecurity is in fact becoming increasingly relevant in the 
context of arbitration, which continues to be a popular choice of 
conflict resolution for parties involved in complex and sensitive 
international disputes. In these types of disputes, digital discovery is 
inevitable and may include confidential information including trade 
secrets, financial information, and personally identifiable information. 
                                                                                                                         
* Mr. Pastore is a litigation partner at Debevoise & Plimpton LLP, where his practice 
focuses on cybersecurity and data privacy matters, as well as intellectual property litigation. 
Mr. Pastore served for more than five years as an Assistant United States Attorney in the 
Southern District of New York, where he prosecuted a number of cybercrimes cases including 
United States v. Monsegur, a/k/a “Sabu”; Operation Cardshop; Operation Dirty R.A.T., and 
the Rove Digital organization as part of Operation Ghost Click. I wish to thank my associates, 
Max Shaul and Michael Brady, for their important contributions to this article.  
1. Jason Healey & Anni Piiparinen, Did China Just Hack the International Court 
Adjudicating Its South China Sea Territorial Claims?, DIPLOMAT (Oct. 27, 2015), 
http://thediplomat.com/2015/10/did-china-just-hack-the-international-court-adjudicating-its-
south-china-sea-territorial-claims/; China Hacks the Peace Palace: All Your EEZ’s Are Belong 
to Us, THREATCONNECT (July 20, 2015), https://www.threatconnect.com/blog/china-hacks-
the-peace-palace-all-your-eezs-are-belong-to-us/; David Tweed, China’s Cyber Spies Take to 
High Seas as Hack Attacks Spike, BLOOMBERG TECH. (Oct. 15 2015), 
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2015-10-15/chinese-cyber-spies-fish-for-enemies-
in-south-china-sea-dispute. 
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Despite the sensitivity surrounding such proceedings—where, unlike 
federal litigation in the United States, even the very existence of the 
arbitration may be highly confidential—cybersecurity has received 
perhaps less attention than it might deserve. Part I of this Essay 
explores the nature of the cybersecurity threat to arbitrations; Part II 
sets forth a few guiding principles that can be used to frame how to 
think about cybersecurity and the closely related field of data privacy; 
and Part III suggests practical steps that those involved in arbitrations 
might take to enhance cybersecurity and prevent violations of 
international data privacy laws. 
I.  UNDERSTANDING THE THREAT 
Though hackers have proven to come in all shapes and sizes—
from the so-called 400-pound man on the bed in his parents’ 
basement2 to highly sophisticated state-backed campaigns designed to 
influence political processes3—we suggest that they can be classified 
into three broad categories: hacktivists, state actors, and criminal 
actors motivated by financial gain. To be clear, these categories are 
not hard and fast, nor are they impermeable. A state actor could be 
motivated by financial gain (e.g., stealing intellectual property of 
manufacturers to establish competing plants in the home country4) or 
by ideological goals (e.g., distributed-denial-of-service (“DDoS”) 
attacks launched against financial institutions in the United States5). 
The purpose of grouping the threats is not to exhaustively categorize 
the types of attacks, but rather to help build a framework that may be 
useful in identifying where attackers may be likely to strike. 
                                                                                                                         
2. Elizabeth Weise, Tech crowd goes wild for Trump’s ‘400-pound hacker’, USA TODAY 
(Sept. 27, 2016), http://www.usatoday.com/story/tech/news/2016/09/27/tech-crowd-goes-wild-
trumps-400-pound-hacker/91168144/. 
3. Damian Paletta, U.S. Blames Russia for Recent Hacks, WALL ST. J. (Oct. 7, 2016), 
http://www.wsj.com/articles/u-s-blames-russia-for-recent-hacks-1475870371. 
4. Erin Ailworth, Chinese firm charged with stealing tech from Mass. Company, BOS. 
GLOBE (June 27, 2013), https://www.bostonglobe.com/business/2013/06/27/feds-charge-
chinese-firm-with-stealing-technology-mass-companyamsc/CTE66TzhtD19qvEfU35RQN/
story.html. 
5. Ellen Nakashima & Matt Zapotosky, U.S. Charges Iran-Linked Hackers With 
Targeting Banks, N.Y. Dam, WASH. POST (Mar. 24, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com 
/world/national-security/justice-department-to-unseal-indictment-against-hackers-linked-to-
iranian-goverment/2016/03/24/9b3797d2-f17b-11e5-a61f-e9c95c06edca_story.html?utm_
term=.f7f4ce2791b3. 
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A. Hacktivists 
The term “hacktivist”—a portmanteau of “hacker” and “activist” 
—nicely captures the motivations of this often-unpredictable group. 
Simply put, they seek to hack not for financial gain, but instead to 
promote or further a social or political cause. These hackers may seek 
to use personal information to embarrass their targets, or launch 
disruptive attacks designed to harm their targets or draw attention to 
their behavior. One of the most famous examples of a hacktivist is 
Hector Xavier Monsegur, known as “Sabu,” the founder of the 
international hacker group “Lulzsec,” that became famous for a series 
of well-publicized publicity stunts and DDoS attacks on religious, 
government, and corporate websites including Visa, Paypal, and 
Mastercard. As part of a plea deal in 2012, Monsegur cooperated with 
government investigators and helped build a case against the five 
other hackers.6 Parties of arbitration should be aware that these 
groups exist and should be cognizant of whether they might be 
transferring any information that could be of interest to these socially 
motivated hackers. 
B. State Actors 
Hackers who are arguably the most difficult to mitigate against 
are state actors. In May of 2014, the Justice Department indicted five 
members of the Chinese People’s Liberation Army under charges of 
hacking into the networks of Westinghouse Electric, the US Steel 
Corporation, and other companies, copying their emails, installing 
malware, and generally stealing intellectual property and other 
information useful to their competitors in China, including state-
owned enterprises (“SOEs”). These five men were identified as 
members of Unit 61398, the Shanghai-based cyber unit of the 
People’s Liberation Army and home to various identifiable online 
hackers. These charges represent the first indictment of a state actor in 
                                                                                                                         
6. Press Release, U.S. Attorney’s Office, Six Hackers in the United States and Abroad 
Charged for Crimes Affecting Over One Million Victims (Mar. 6, 2012), 
https://archives.fbi.gov/archives/newyork/press-releases/2012/six-hackers-in-the-united-states-
and-abroad-charged-for-crimes-affecting-over-one-million-victims); Susan Candiotti, Five 
Arrested In High-Profile Cyberattacks, CNN (Mar. 7, 2012), http://edition. 
cnn.com/2012/03/06/us/new-york-hacker-arrests/. 
 
1026 FORDHAM INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 40:3 
a cyberattack.7 Though not directly related to arbitration, this case 
involved the commercially motivated theft of intellectual property, 
information that can often be found in the discovery stages of 
arbitration proceedings.8 It is thus important for parties to arbitration 
to recognize if the information they are sharing in discovery may 
include matters of interest to state actors conducting economic 
espionage. 
C. Financially Motivated Criminals  
The final category of cyber attackers is criminal actors. These 
hackers are usually interested primarily in commercial gain. To give a 
recent example, in March of 2016, a Russian hacker located in the 
Ukraine listed forty-six elite US law firms as targets in a phishing 
attack aimed at retrieving confidential information of clients to sell 
for purposes of insider trading.9 Law firms, which store large amounts 
of confidential information about clients, are just one example of the 
types of entities targeted by criminal actors who seek to turn a profit 
off of stolen data. Given that arbitration often involves the 
transmission of sensitive commercial information that others might 
use for profit, parties to arbitration should be particularly cognizant of 
the threat of these types of hackers. 
                                                                                                                         
7. Press Release, Department of Justice, U.S. Charges Five Chinese Military Hackers for 
Cyber Espionage Against U.S. Corporations and a Labor Organization for Commercial 
Advantage (May 19, 2014), https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/us-charges-five-chinese-military-
hackers-cyber-espionage-against-us-corporations-and-labor; Michael S. Schmidt, 5 in China 
Army Face U.S. Charges of Cyberattacks, N.Y. TIMES (May 19, 2014), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2014/05/20/us/us-to-charge-chinese-workers-with-cyberspying.html
?_r=1; Devlin Barrett & Siobham Gorman, U.S. Charges Five in Chinese Army With Hacking, 
WALL ST. J. (May 19, 2014), http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB100014240527023044227
04579571604060696532. 
8.  See, e.g., Thomas Fox-Brewster, U.S Accuses 7 Iranians of Cyberattacks on Banks 
and Dam, FORBES (Mar. 24, 2016), 
http://www.forbes.com/sites/thomasbrewster/2016/03/24/iran-hackers-charged-bank-ddos-
attacks-banks/#623b95417f8d. State actors might also engage in hacking as a form of cyber 
warfare or a terror attack but this activity is less of a risk in arbitration. Id. 
9. Claire Bushey, Russian Cyber Criminal Targets Elite Chicago Law Firms, CRAIN’S 
CHI. BUS. (Mar. 29, 2016), http://www.chicagobusiness.com/article/20160329/NEW
S04/160329840/russian-cyber-criminal-targets-elite-chicago-law-firms; Booz Allen Hamilton, 
Inc., Cyberthreats to Law Firms, CYBER4SIGHT 6-7 (Apr. 14, 2016), http://m.boozallen.com/
content/dam/boozallen/documents/2016/05/Cyberthreats%20to%20Law%20Firms_new_heade
r.pdf. 
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II.  TOWARDS A FRAMEWORK: GUIDING PRINCIPLES  
The examples above constitute only a tiny portion of the 
cyberattacks that can occur. The imperative to prevent the harms 
outlined above may seem self-evident, but the law also suggests that, 
aside from staving off reputational harm, there are affirmative 
obligations on both the tribunal and the parties appearing before it to 
pay heed to cybersecurity and take steps to protect client confidences 
in the digital world. For example, the Florida Bar Rules of 
Professional Conduct 4-1.1 states, “Competent representation also 
involves safeguarding confidential information relating to the 
representation, including, but not limited to, electronic transmissions 
and communications,” and many other state bar associations use 
similar language surrounding precautions for cyber security.10 By 
establishing procedures for the storage and transfer of sensitive 
information at the outset of arbitration proceedings, the parties and 
the tribunal may greatly mitigate the risk of future threats. 
Before identifying the specific steps that practitioners may take 
to discharge what is increasingly viewed as an ethical duty and what 
is, at a minimum, a need to mitigate reputational risk, it is helpful to 
consider guiding principles for formulating the specific procedures 
that may be adopted in any particular matter. We suggest here that 
cybersecurity—and, relatedly, data privacy concerns—can most 
effectively be addressed once the practitioner knows her “assets” and 
“architecture.” That is, the sensitive information that one has (e.g., 
customer lists of a client; sensitive trade secrets developed through 
substantial R&D expenditures; potentially market-moving 
information about future business plans) and where one stores it (e.g., 
with a third-party cloud provider; on portable (and easily lost) 
external media like thumb drives; on networks accessible by other 
practitioners in the firm without regard to whether they need access to 
such data). 
Though this process may sound simple, it often poses unforeseen 
challenges, particularly for the practitioner who practices in a large 
firm where information decisions (such as where and how to store 
information digitally) often are made with little or no input from the 
practicing attorneys, but are instead delegated to information staff 
                                                                                                                         
10.  In re: Amendments to Rules Regulating the Fla. Bar 4-1.1 & 6-10.3, 200 So. 3d 1225 
(Fla. 2016); see also CA Eth. Op. 2010, Cal. St. Bar. Comm. Prof. Resp., 179 (2010); NY Eth. 
Op. 1019, N.Y. St. Bar. Assn. Comm. Prof. Eth. (2014). 
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whose primary focus is on keeping the data readily accessible. Indeed, 
in many ways, there is a tension between the cybersecurity concerns 
that have been pushed to the fore and the “always available” 
mentality that permeates law firm and law firm client expectations. 
Layered on top of the cybersecurity concerns is the closely 
related field of data privacy. Even now, many information technology 
staff (and, perhaps, more than a few lawyers) remain only vaguely 
aware of data privacy laws—most prominently in the European 
Union—that forbid the exportation of sensitive data from the 
European Union to jurisdictions viewed as less secure, including, 
most notably, the United States. It is therefore possible that an 
entirely innocent measure taken by an information technologist (e.g., 
the transfer of data from a full server in London to an available one in 
the United States) may trigger liability for the practitioner.11 Thus, it 
is helpful to identify the critical data assets and the architecture used 
to store them to effectively build procedures that satisfy both 
cybersecurity and data privacy concerns. 
III.  CYBERSECURITY IN PRACTICE 
Once the parties and the tribunal have assessed the assets and 
architecture, the parties and the tribunal may then consider the 
following three thematic principles with respect to the threat of 
cyberattackers in the context of arbitration: (i) the establishment of 
security protocols for the storage and transfer of sensitive 
information, (ii) limiting of the disclosure of sensitive information, 
and (iii) in the event of any breach/attack, the process for notifying 
affected person(s) and for correcting/mitigating the breach/attack. 
There are a variety of factors to consider when adopting security 
protocols for the transfer of sensitive information. First, identifying 
the categories of particularly sensitive information that merit 
enhanced cybersecurity procedures is a useful practical step. The 
reality is that much of cybersecurity fails because the mechanisms 
used are too cumbersome or subject to human error. Accordingly, 
trying to implement restrictive cybersecurity measures on all data 
involved in an arbitration proceeding may be counterproductive in 
                                                                                                                         
11. Boris Segalis, Christoph Ritzer, & Andrew Hoffman, Hamburg DPA’s Safe Harbor 
Fines Spell Further Uncertainty and Risk for Global Companies, NORTON ROSE FULBRIGHT 
(June 8, 2016), http://www.dataprotectionreport.com/2016/06/hamburg-dpa-fines-three-com
panies-for-continued-reliance-on-safe-harbor/. 
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that it over-designates information (desensitizing practitioners to the 
truly critical information) and results in overly cumbersome processes 
for information that, in reality, needs little to no additional 
protections. 
Once the key information is identified, procedures can be 
developed for the transfer of sensitive information between and 
among the tribunal and the parties. Such measures can include both 
endorsement of specific processes, as well as prohibitions on riskier 
procedures. For instance, particularly sensitive information might be 
disclosed using a secure portal rather than commercial email accounts 
that may be more easily subject to compromise. The parties who 
believe that such procedures are necessary might specifically endorse 
a secure portal platform (such as Accellion) while banning the use of 
free email accounts (such as Gmail or Yahoo). At a minimum, the 
parties may develop procedures whereby files containing sensitive 
information are password protected (and the password is separately 
transmitted through another channel, such as text messaging) when 
sent to a commercially available free email account. 
Parties may also wish to pay particular attention to the 
vulnerabilities posed by frequent travel—a key concern for many 
international arbitration practitioners who often work in jurisdictions 
far from the home office and under less-than-ideal circumstances. For 
instance, the use of portable media such as thumb drives or locally 
stored copies of documents on laptop computers can pose significant 
risks if those easily portable media are lost, or worse, stolen by a bad 
actor intent on exploiting the information contained therein. For that 
reason, parties can consider the adoption of encryption standards for 
portable media so that, even if the drive or computer is lost or stolen, 
the data on it is nonetheless likely to remain secure. If the sensitivity 
of the data warrants it, parties also may choose to outright ban the 
local storage of such documents on easily lost media. Travel also 
poses risks for insecure networks accessed through public WiFi spots 
that may encourage snooping and data capture. Parties may consider a 
potential prohibition against the use of public WiFi to access sensitive 
information unless appropriate measures (e.g., use of VPN) are taken. 
The second principle for mitigation of the threat of 
cyberattackers in the context of arbitration is limiting the disclosure of 
sensitive information. One way to minimize disclosure is to restrict 
the access of certain information to only those persons having a “need 
to know.” Limiting the number of persons accessing data reduces the 
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potential for breach. Parties should also consider limiting the 
submission of sensitive information to only that information which is 
truly necessary for the arbitration. 
In addition, we have recently seen the dramatic consequences of 
the practice of maintaining decades-old records that have outlived 
their useful life.12 An oft-repeated adage for cybersecurity 
practitioners is that, “they can’t hack what you don’t have.” Like 
mapping assets and architecture, however, this process may prove 
more difficult than it appears at first blush. Practitioners find old 
records useful as models or samples for future work product, so the 
wholesale destruction of older records may not be feasible from a 
business perspective. That being said, there are likely categories of 
documents (e.g., exhibits listing personally identifying information) 
that provide little or no future business value and can be destroyed 
with little impact on the business. 
Finally, parties to arbitration should be prepared in the event of 
breach/attack, and thus may consider establishing the process for 
notifying affected person(s) and for correcting/mitigating any 
breach/attack. Ensuring that the parties have established policies and 
procedures related to detecting breaches, determining their scope, and 
notifying affected parties can help provide a clear path to follow if 
and when a data breach occurs. These procedures can take many 
forms but, at a minimum, it is helpful to identify a point-of-contact for 
each party (and, in tribunals with multiple arbitrators, the tribunal) 
responsible for coordinating communications in the event of a breach. 
All constituents of an arbitration should remain cognizant of legal 
obligations with respect to the reporting of any breach, whether to 
affected parties, regulatory agencies, or other governmental 
authorities. In this respect, international arbitration raises unique 
concerns due to varying legal regimes, which may also differ on a 
state-to-state basis. 
CONCLUSION 
 
As the frequency and sophistication of cyberattacks grow, so 
will the commensurate risks to arbitration. Though the threat is likely 
                                                                                                                         
12. Rishi Iyengar, What to Know About the ‘Panama Papers’ Leak, TIME (Apr. 4, 2016), 
http://time.com/4280302/panama-papers-leak-vladimir-putin-mossack-fonseca/. 
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never to be eliminated, it can be mitigated. And accepting the 
inevitable—that breaches have occurred (and will continue to 
occur)—in connection with arbitrations can help practitioners 
honestly explore the appropriate response to such breaches and how 
they can be mitigated. If all involved in arbitral proceedings approach 
these concerns with a shared sense of collective responsibility, we 
suggest that real gains can be seen in preventing and mitigating harm 
from the cybersecurity threat. 
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